A piece of code can actually manipulate the physical memory chip by repeatedly accessing nearby capacitors in a burgeoning new hack called Rowhammering. Rowhammer hacking is so brand new no one’s actually done it yet. Google’s Project Zero security initiative figured out how to exploit an aspect of a physical component in some types of DDR memory chips. The hack can give the user increased system rights regardless of an untrusted status. Any Intel-compatible PCs with this chip and running Linux are vulnerable – in theory. Project Zero pulled it off but it isn’t exactly something to panic about unless you are doing both those things: using DRAM and running linux.
A lot of readers might be susceptible to this security hack but most won’t want to read the technical details. If you are interested you can check out the project zero blog piece about it. The security flaw is in a specific chip, the DRAM, or dynamic random-access memory chip. The chip is supposed to just store information in the form of bits saved on a series of capacitors. The hack works by switching the value of bits stored in DDR3 chip modules known as DIMMs. so, DRAM is the style of chip, and each DRAM houses several DIMMs. Hackers researching on behalf of Project Zero basically designed a program to repeatedly access sections of data stored on the vulnerable DRAM until the statistical odds of one or more DIMMS retaining a charge when it shouldn’t becomes a statistical reality.
IN 2014, this kind of hack was only theoretical until, scientists proved this kind of “bit flipping” is completely possible. Repeatedly accessing an area of a specific DIMM can become so reliable as to allow the hacker to predict the change of contents stored in that section of DIMM memory. Last Monday(March 9th, 2015) Project Zero demonstrated exactly how a piece of software can translate this flaw into an effective security attack.
“The thing that is really impressive to me in what we see here is in some sense an analog- and manufacturing-related bug that is potentially exploitable in software,” David Kanter, senior editor of the Microprocessor Report, told Ars. “This is reaching down into the underlying physics of the hardware, which from my standpoint is cool to see. In essence, the exploit is jumping several layers of the stack.”
Why it’s called Rowhammering.
The memory in a DDR-style chip is configured in an array of rows and columns. Each row is grouped with others into large blocks which handle the accessable memory for a specific application, including the memory resources used to run the operating system. There is a security feature called a “sandbox”, designed to protect the data integrity and ensure the overall system stays secure. A sandbox can only be accessed through a corresponding application or the Operating System. Bit- flipping a DDR chip works when a hacker writes an application that can access two chosen rows of memory. The app would then access those same 2 rows hundreds of thousands of times, aka hammering. When the targeted bits flip from ones to zeros, matching a dummy list of data in the application, the target bits are left alone with the new value.
The implications of this style hack are hard to see for the layman but profound in the security world. Most data networks allow a limited list of administrators to have special privileges. It would be possible, using a rowhammer attack, to allow an existing account to suddenly gain administrative privileges to the system. In the vast majority of systems that kind of access would allow access into several other accounts. Administrative access would also allow some hackers to alter existing security features. The bigger the data center, the more users with accounts accessing the database, the more useful this vulnerability is.
The Physics of a Vulnerability
We’re all used to newer tech coming with unforeseen security problems. Ironically, this vulnerability is present in newer DDR3 memory chips. This is because the newer chips are so small there is actually and is the result of the ever smaller dimensions of the silicon. The DRAM cells are too close together in this kind of chip, making it possible to take a nearby chip, flip it back and forth repeatedly, and eventually make the one next to it – the target bit that is not directly accessible- to flip.
Note: The Rowhammer attack being described doesn’t work against newer DDR4 silicon or DIMMs that contain ECC(error correcting code), capabilities.
The Players and the Code:
Mark Seaborn, and Thomas Dullien are the guys who finally wrote a piece of code able to take advantage of this flaw. They created 2 rowhammer attacks which can run as processes. Those processes have no security privileges whatsoever but can end up gaining administrative access to a x86-64 Linux system. The first exploit was a Native Client module, incorporating itself into the platform as part of Google Chrome. Google developers caught this attack and altered an instruction in Chrome called CLFLUSH and the exploit stopped working. Seaborn and Dullien were psyched that they were able to get that far and write the second attempt shortly thereafter.
The second exploit, looks like a totally normal Linux process. It allowed Seaborn and Dullien to access to all physical memory which proved the vulnerability is actually a threat to any machine with this type of DRAM.
The ARS article about this has a great quote by Irene Abezgauz, a product VP at Dyadic Security:
The Project Zero guys took on the challenge of leveraging the concept of rowhammer into an actual exploit. What’s impressive is the combination of lots of deep technical knowledge with quite a bit of hacker creativity. What they did was create attack techniques in which flipping just a single bit in a specific location allows them to execute any code they want with root privileges or escape a sandbox. This is impressive by itself, but they added to this quite a few creative solutions to make it more likely to succeed in a real world scenario and not just in the lab. They figured out ways for better targeting of the specific locations in memory they needed to flip, improved the chances of the attack to succeed by creating (“spraying”) multiple locations where a flipped bit would make the right impact, and came up with several ideas to leverage this into actual privileged code execution. This combination makes for one of the coolest exploits I’ve seen in a while.
Project Zero didn’t name which models of DDR3 are susceptible to rowhammering. They also claim that this attack could work on a variety of operating platforms, even though they only tried it on a Linux computer running x86-64 hardware, something that they didn’t technically prove but seems very believable considering the success and expertise they seem to carry behind that opinion.
So, is Rowhammering a real threat or just some BS?
There isn’t an obvious, practical application for this yet. Despite how powerful the worst-case scenario would be, this threat doesn’t really come with a guarantee of sweeping the internet like some other, less-recent vulnerability exploits. The overwhelming majority of hacks are attempted from remote computers but Seaborn and Dullien apparently needed physical access to incorporate their otherwise unprivlidged code into the targeted system. Also, because the physical shape of the chip dictates which rows are vulnerable it may be the case that users who want to increase security to protect against this exploit can just reconfigure where the administrative privileges are stored and manipulated on the chip. Thirdly, rowhammering as Project Zero describes actually requires over 540,000 memory accesses less than 64 milliseconds – that’s a memory speed demand that means some systems can’t even run the necessary code. Hijacking a system using rowhammering with these limitations is presently not a real threat.
People used to say the same thing about memory corruption exploits, though. For examples: buffer overflow or a use-after-free both allow hack-attempts to squeeze malicious shell code into protected memory of a computer. Rowhammering is differnt because it is so simple. It only allows increased privileges for the hacker or piece of code, which is a real threat if it becomes developed as thoroughly as the development of memory corruption exploits has. The subtle difference might even be hard to grasp now, but now that the work has been done it’s the usual race between security analysts who would love to protect against it and the criminal world trying to dream up a way to make it more viable. Rob Graham, CEO of Errata Security, wrote further on the subject, here.
In short, this is noteworthy because a physical design flaw in a chip is being exploited, as opposed to a software oversight or code efficacy problem. A piece of code is actually affecting the physical inside of the computer during the attack.
Or, as Kanter, of the Microprocessor Report, said:
“This is not like software, where in theory we can go patch the software and get a patch distributed via Windows update within the next two to three weeks. If you want to actually fix this problem, we need to go out and replace, on a DIMM by DIMM basis, billions of dollars’ worth of DRAM. From a practical standpoint that’s not ever going to happen.”
Jonathan is a freelance writer living in Brooklyn, NY